When does group chat promote cooperation in shared resource governance?
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作者:
Ahn, Minwoo
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机构:
Univ Arizona, Sch Landscape Architecture & Planning, Tucson, AZ 85721 USA
Univ Arizona, Climate Assessment Southwest, Tucson, AZ 85721 USA
Arizona State Univ, Ctr Behav Inst & Environm, Tempe, AZ 85287 USAUniv Arizona, Sch Landscape Architecture & Planning, Tucson, AZ 85721 USA
Ahn, Minwoo
[1
,2
,3
]
Balakrishna, Raksha
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机构:
Arizona State Univ, Ctr Behav Inst & Environm, Tempe, AZ 85287 USA
Arizona State Univ, Sch Sustainabil, Tempe, AZ USAUniv Arizona, Sch Landscape Architecture & Planning, Tucson, AZ 85721 USA
Balakrishna, Raksha
[3
,4
]
Simeone, Michael
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机构:
Arizona State Univ, Sch Complex Adapt Syst, Tempe, AZ USAUniv Arizona, Sch Landscape Architecture & Planning, Tucson, AZ 85721 USA
Simeone, Michael
[5
]
Janssen, Marco A.
论文数: 0引用数: 0
h-index: 0
机构:
Arizona State Univ, Ctr Behav Inst & Environm, Tempe, AZ 85287 USA
Arizona State Univ, Sch Sustainabil, Tempe, AZ USA
Arizona State Univ, Sch Complex Adapt Syst, Tempe, AZ USAUniv Arizona, Sch Landscape Architecture & Planning, Tucson, AZ 85721 USA
Janssen, Marco A.
[3
,4
,5
]
机构:
[1] Univ Arizona, Sch Landscape Architecture & Planning, Tucson, AZ 85721 USA
[2] Univ Arizona, Climate Assessment Southwest, Tucson, AZ 85721 USA
[3] Arizona State Univ, Ctr Behav Inst & Environm, Tempe, AZ 85287 USA
[4] Arizona State Univ, Sch Sustainabil, Tempe, AZ USA
[5] Arizona State Univ, Sch Complex Adapt Syst, Tempe, AZ USA
COLLECTIVE ACTION;
SOCIAL DILEMMAS;
TOPIC MODELS;
COMMUNICATION;
GAME;
EVOLUTION;
COMMONS;
D O I:
10.1057/s41599-024-03992-5
中图分类号:
C [社会科学总论];
学科分类号:
03 ;
0303 ;
摘要:
When people use shared resources, overextraction can occur. While deliberation tends to mitigate shared resource exploitation problems, the question remains: under what conditions does group chat improve cooperation in shared resource dilemmas? This study analyzes chat and game data from about 1500 rounds of gameplay involving 143 groups across 4 resource types using Sentiment Analysis and Structural Topic Model. We find that, despite their fundamental differences, the 4 games tend to have similar discussions, including strategizing actions, coordinating choices, and socialization, but they differ in which topics explain cooperation within each game. Discussion topics promoting cooperation include coordination in the foraging game (FOR) and long-term goals in the groundwater game (GG). However, discussion topics negatively associated with cooperation include off-topic/socialization in FOR and the irrigation game (IRR) and crop choice affirmation in GG. We suggest that the context in which communication occurs matters, and biophysical characteristics, rules of the game, and levels of uncertainty explain some variations of our findings.
机构:
Hokkaido Univ, Grad Sch Letters, Ctr Expt Res Social Sci, Sapporo, Hokkaido 0600810, Japan
Hokkaido Univ, Grad Sch Letters, Ctr Social Mind, Sapporo, Hokkaido 0600810, JapanHokkaido Univ, Grad Sch Letters, Ctr Expt Res Social Sci, Sapporo, Hokkaido 0600810, Japan
Yamagishi, Toshio
Mifune, Nobuhiro
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机构:
Hokkaido Univ, Dept Behav Sci, Sapporo, Hokkaido 060, JapanHokkaido Univ, Grad Sch Letters, Ctr Expt Res Social Sci, Sapporo, Hokkaido 0600810, Japan
机构:
Chinese Acad Social Sci, Natl Inst Int Strategy, Beijing 100007, Peoples R ChinaChinese Acad Social Sci, Natl Inst Int Strategy, Beijing 100007, Peoples R China
机构:
National Institute of International Strategy, Chinese Academy of Social SciencesNational Institute of International Strategy, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences
机构:
Harvard Univ, Program Evolutionary Dynam, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
Harvard Univ, Dept Organism & Evolutionary Biol, Cambridge, MA 02138 USAHarvard Univ, Program Evolutionary Dynam, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
Hauser, Oliver P.
Nowak, Martin A.
论文数: 0引用数: 0
h-index: 0
机构:
Harvard Univ, Program Evolutionary Dynam, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
Harvard Univ, Dept Organism & Evolutionary Biol, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
Harvard Univ, Dept Math, Cambridge, MA 02138 USAHarvard Univ, Program Evolutionary Dynam, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
Nowak, Martin A.
Rand, David G.
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机构:
Yale Univ, Dept Psychol, New Haven, CT 06520 USA
Yale Univ, Dept Econ, New Haven, CT 06520 USA
Yale Univ, Program Cognit Sci, New Haven, CT USA
Yale Univ, Sch Management, New Haven, CT USAHarvard Univ, Program Evolutionary Dynam, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA