The world is facing the challenge of energy transformation, and the integrated technology of mining, dressing, and backfilling (ITMDB) is a green mining technology that can effectively reduce resource waste and environmental pollution, thereby promoting sustainable development in the traditional energy sector. However, widespread adoption of ITMDB remains limited due to various factors. To address this, we construct an evolutionary game model between the government and coal enterprises. With system dynamics simulations, we analyze the impacts of subsidy, punishment, information sharing policy and their combinations on ITMDB adoption. Then, Empirical research was conducted to validate the simulation results and analyze the mechanism and heterogeneity effects using data from A-share listed coal companies in China. The results show that (1) A combined strategy of punishment and information sharing is most effective in encouraging ITMDB adoption. (2) The subsidy policy can have a negative effect in certain situations. (3) The optimal adoption strategy promotes technology adoption through executives green cognition (4) The optimal adoption strategy has the most significant effects on enterprises located in the central and eastern regions, areas with a lower proportion of secondary industry, and mature companies. Finally, this study provides policy recommendations for ITMDB adoption.