Coordination and incentive mechanism under bilateral innovation information asymmetry

被引：0
|
作者：
Xiao M. [1 ]
Ren M. [1 ]
Xu L. [2 ]
机构：
[1] Department of Information and Management Science, Henan Agricultural University, Zhengzhou
[2] Department of Food Science and Technology, Henan Agricultural University, Zhengzhou
来源：
Jisuanji Jicheng Zhizao Xitong/Computer Integrated Manufacturing Systems, CIMS | 2020年 / 26卷 / 11期
关键词：
Bilateral innovation information asymmetry; Innovation incentive mechanism; Principal-agent theory; Product innovation utility; Supply chains;
D O I：
10.13196/j.cims.2020.11.027
中图分类号：
学科分类号：
摘要：
Aiming at the problem of bilateral innovation information asymmetry, an innovative incentive mechanism model based on principal-agent theory was established. The impact of innovation level, product innovation utility and supplier-retained revenue on the setting of various parameters in incentive mechanism provided by manufacturer was analyzed. The research showed that the innovation degree of both parties in the supply chain was related to the incentive coefficient and product innovation utility, and the setting of the incentive coefficient was related to the innovation investment cost coefficient of both parties. The optimal fixed payment received by the supplier was always less than its own retained revenue and would increase as the retained revenue increase. © 2020, Editorial Department of CIMS. All right reserved.
引用
收藏
页码：3177 / 3184
页数：7
相关论文
共 25 条
  • [1] CHEN Wei, ZHANG Xumei, SONG Han, The relationship contract mechanism of knowledge transaction among supply chain enterprises: A research perspective based on cooperative innovation, Scientific Research Management, 36, 7, pp. 38-48, (2015)
  • [2] GUPTA S, LOULOU R., Process innovation, product differentiation, and channel structure: strategic incentives in a duopoly, Marketing Science, 17, 4, pp. 301-316, (1998)
  • [3] KIM B., Coordinating an innovation in supply chain management, European Journal of Operational Research, 123, 3, pp. 568-584, (2000)
  • [4] CHEN Shuzhen, Research onenterprise innovation investment in dual-channel supply chain environment, Commercial Research, 3, pp. 6-12, (2010)
  • [5] SHAN Miyuan, LIU Chao, LIU Xiaohong, Research on the impact of government innovation subsidy on retailers' dual channel supply chain, East China Economic Management, 30, 9, pp. 120-124, (2016)
  • [6] WANG Jingqi, SHIN H., The impact of contracts and competition on upstream innovation in a supply chain, Production and Operations Management, 24, 1, pp. 134-146, (2015)
  • [7] YENIPAZARLI A., To collaborate or not to collaborate: Prompting upstream eco-efficient innovation in a supply chain, European Journal of Operational Research, 260, 2, pp. 571-587, (2017)
  • [8] LIU Cong, HUANG Weilai, ZHENG Benrong, Et al., Manufacturers considering marketing efforts and innovation ability to stimulate supplier innovation decision-making, Systems Engineering-Theory and Practice, 37, 12, pp. 3040-3051, (2017)
  • [9] SHEN Yuelin, WILLEMS S P., Coordinating a channel with asymmetric cost information and the manufacturer's optimality, International Journal of Production Economics, 135, 1, pp. 125-135, (2012)
  • [10] CAO Erbao, MA Yujie, WAN Can, Et al., Contracting with asymmetric cost information in a dual-channel supply chain, Operations Research Letters, 41, 4, pp. 410-414, (2013)
123