Utility Simulation Evaluation of Dynamic Fines Strategy for Illegal Parking Based on Evolutionary Game

被引：0
|
作者：
Mou Z.-H. [1 ]
Wang H.-B. [1 ]
Lin B.-J. [2 ]
Chen Y.-Q. [1 ]
Jin C.-C. [1 ]
Chen Y.-Y. [3 ]
机构：
[1] School of Transportation Engineering, Shandong Jianzhu University, Jinan
[2] Jinan Urban Planning and Design Institute, Jinan
[3] College of Metropolitan Transportation, Beijing University of Technology, Beijing
来源：
Jiaotong Yunshu Xitong Gongcheng Yu Xinxi/Journal of Transportation Systems Engineering and Information Technology | 2022年 / 22卷 / 01期
关键词：
Asymmetric evolutionary game; Dynamic fines strategy; Dynamic optimal control; Parking fines; Urban traffic;
D O I：
10.16097/j.cnki.1009-6744.2022.01.017
中图分类号：
学科分类号：
摘要：
This paper aims to study the inhibitory effect of the improved dynamic fines strategy on illegal parking and obtain the optimal solution of the strategy. In this paper, the drivers and law enforcers are the two groups of players in the game. Based on the improved copy dynamic equation, the dynamic fines optimal control model is established with the goal of minimizing the total social cost. Then the equilibrium point and stability of the model are discussed, and the optimal solution of the model is solved by the Pontryagin principle of minimum. Finally, simulation tests were carried out on the violation restraint effect and the strategy cost of the dynamic fines strategy before and after the improvement. The simulation results show that: (1) The improved dynamic fines model can find a reasonable evolution direction of the parking violation problem, which can reduce the intensity of law enforcement while continuously reducing the probability of violation; (2) In a critical state, that is, the dynamic fine coefficient tends to a stable value, and the law enforcer maintains a short-term continuous law enforcement state. The improved dynamic fines strategy can reduce the amount of fines by changing the commonly used fine methods to realize the governance of illegal parking problems; (3) In terms of the efficiency of governing illegal parking, the critical state is compared with the most sensitive state, that is, continuous law enforcement is twice as fast as dynamic law enforcement; (4) Compared with the dynamic fines strategy before the improvement, the improved dynamic fines strategy has stronger violation restraint, lower strategy cost, and longer-lasting law enforcement effectiveness. The required enforcement is lower and there will be no recurrence of illegal parking cycles in a short period of time. Copyright © 2022 by Science Press.
引用
收藏
页码：152 / 162
页数：10
相关论文
共 11 条
  • [1] MICHAEL C, TERESA T, KELCEE R., Using prompts and feedback to reduce illegal parking in a university parking lot, Journal of Organizational Behavior Management, 40, 3, pp. 333-345, (2020)
  • [2] TANG H, PENG A, ZHANG D, Et al., SSD real-time illegal parking detection based on contextual information transmission, CMC: Computers, Materials & Continua, 62, 1, pp. 293-307, (2020)
  • [3] LI H, NING X Q, YU L, Et al., Combined flexible working arrangements and time-dependent parking charges, Journal of Transportation Systems Engineering and Information Technology, 20, 2, pp. 1-7, (2020)
  • [4] CAO Y, YANG Z Z, ZUO Z Y., Regional differential parking charge strategy based on metro park-and-ride, Journal of Transportation Systems Engineering and Information Technology, 17, 3, pp. 12-18, (2017)
  • [5] XUE Y, PENG Y., Research on innovation incentive policies of prefabricated buildings based on evolutionary game theory, Mathematics in Practice and Theory, 51, 5, pp. 64-73, (2021)
  • [6] XU S H, HU S L, HAN C F., Stochastic evolutionary game model of NIMBY events based on improved repetitive dynamic equations, Mathematics in Practice and Theory, 51, 15, pp. 1-12, (2021)
  • [7] WANG H, LU S F., Illegal parking behavior model based on evolutionary game theory, Transport Research, 6, 4, pp. 102-108, (2020)
  • [8] XU X L, PENG C Y., A dynamic parking charge optimal control model under perspective of commuters' evolutionary game behavior, Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, 490, pp. 1096-1110, (2018)
  • [9] WANG Z H, LI H, ZHANG B., The impact of bounded rational differences in consumers on suppliers' product pricing: A two-level population game model, Systems Engineering-Theory & Practice, 41, X, pp. 1-16, (2021)
  • [10] DANG Q., Study on the punishment of urban parking in our country, (2017)
12