Closed-loop supply chain decisions under government subsidies and VAT rebates

Based on the government subsidy and value added tax (VAT) refund policy, through the Stackelberg game method, we establish four closed-loop supply chain decision models consisting of manufacturers, recyclers and consumers, and derive the corresponding optimal prices, subsidies, and tax refund policies. We further compare and analyze the recycling price, recycling volume, corporate profit and social welfare under four different models, and obtain the optimal decision-making choices of the government and enterprises. The study shows: 1) The social welfare in four cases increases with the increase of consumers' environmental awareness; for policy makers, if the consumers' environmental awareness is low, only government subsidy policies are optimal; if the consumer's environmental awareness is high, then the coexistence of government subsidies and VAT refunds is optimal. 2) In the green consumer market, the manufacturer's choice of two different pricing strategies is affected by two factors: the size of the green market segment and the strength of government policy. © 2021, Editorial Office of Control and Decision. All right reserved.