Product appearance and functionality quality competition model in toy manufacturers duopoly market

被引：0
|
作者：
Yi Y. [1 ]
Chen Y. [1 ]
机构：
[1] School of Management, Jinan University, Guangzhou
来源：
| 1600年 / CIMS卷 / 26期
关键词：
Appearance quality; Duopoly competition; Functionality quality; Toy manufacturer;
D O I：
10.13196/j.cims.2020.08.021
中图分类号：
学科分类号：
摘要：
To explore the problem of toy manufacturer's decision-making of product quality competition with consumers' different preferences for the appearance and functionality quality of toy products, a duopoly competitive game model consisting of a large toy manufacturer and a small toy manufacturer was established. The duopoly toy manufacturers' equilibrium appearance and functionality quality, price and profit were analyzed, and the influences of consumers' appearance preferences coefficient and quality R&D cost coefficient on the equilibrium results were discussed respectively. The main results showed that consumers' preference for appearance quality attributes of toy products would have an adverse effect on the large manufacturer while the small manufacturer benefit from it. The effect of quality R&D cost coefficient on the decision-making of appearance and functionality quality level of the large and small toy manufacturers were very different. For the small manufacturer, the effect depended on the size of the market, and the increase in quality R&D cost coefficient did not necessarily reduce the profit of toy manufacturers. © 2020, Editorial Department of CIMS. All right reserved.
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页码：2216 / 2231
页数：15
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