Application of hybrid strategies of complex network attack and defense games

Critical infrastructure networks serve as the backbone of modern society's operations, and the application of game theory to safeguard these networks against deliberate attacks under resource constraints is of paramount importance. Regrettably, the existing body of research on hybrid attack and defense strategies for nodes and edges is notably scarce, despite the ubiquity of such strategies in practical contexts. Current understanding regarding the establishment of a cost constraint model within the framework of hybrid attack and defense strategies, the strategic inclinations of both adversarial and defensive parties under varying cost constraint coefficients, and the influence of resource allocation ratios on equilibrium outcomes remains limited. Consequently, this study constructs a game-theoretic model for the engagement of critical infrastructure networks under non-uniform cost constraints, incorporating hybrid attack and defense strategies for nodes and edges, and conducts an equilibrium analysis across a range of cost constraint coefficients and resource allocation ratios. The findings reveal that when resource availability is limited, both attackers and defenders are inclined towards a strategy of concentrated resource allocation; in contrast, under most circumstances, defenders exhibit a preference for an equitable distribution of resources.