Research on production-decision of automakers considering consumer’s low-carbon preference under the government reward-penalty mechanism

Under the conditions of government reward-penalty mechanism and consumers’ low-carbon preference, this paper constructs the consumer’s utility function, the automakers’ profit function and evolutionary game model between government and automakers. And the relevant factors of the dual-credit policy, such as credit transaction price and the requirement of credit ratio are included in the model. It also analyzes the evolutionary stable strategy of automakers’ production-decisions under the situation that the government replaces subsidies with rewards and regulate the market with penalties. The results show that: 1) Government adopts dynamic rewards and static penalties as the optimal policy combination. In addition, moderately increasing penalties will help to improve the production enthusiasm of new energy automakers. 2) A higher trading price of credit is more conducive to the rapid development of the new energy vehicle industry in the short term, but it is easy to cause market fluctuations. 3) The improvement of the endurance performance attributes and quality attributes of new energy vehicles will increase the profit advantage of new energy automakers, but the improvement of consumers’ recognition of endurance performance attributes and quality attributes will reduce their profit advantage. © 2023 Systems Engineering Society of China. All rights reserved.