An evolutionary game model for low-carbon technology adoption by rival manufacturers

被引:0
|
作者
Yang Y. [1 ]
Xie Y. [2 ]
机构
[1] College of Economics and Management, China Jiliang University, Hangzhou
[2] Faculty of Business and Law, Anglia Ruskin University, Bishop Hall Lane, Chelmsford
关键词
carbon tax; evolutionary game; low carbon awareness; low carbon technology;
D O I
10.1504/IJISE.2023.133528
中图分类号
学科分类号
摘要
Manufacturers’ decisions on adopting low carbon technology are influenced by many factors, including the consumers’ awareness of low-carbon technology and the governmental carbon tax scheme. In this research, we considered competition between two rival manufacturers and constructed a demand function that considers carbon emission and price as parameters rather than constraints. We developed an evolutionary game model in bounded rationality space and analysed the game between two manufacturers under four game scenarios. The impacts of consumers’ awareness of low-carbon technologies and governmental carbon tax scheme were clearly demonstrated in the manufacturers’ behaviour strategies towards the adoption of low-carbon technology. The research findings offered insights into the level of consumers’ low-carbon awareness that stimulates both manufactures to adopt low-carbon technology, and the threshold of low-carbon awareness that incentivises only one manufacturer to adopt low carbon technology. Meanwhile, authorities should enact the carbon tax within appropriate range in order to reduce carbon emissions. Copyright © 2023 Inderscience Enterprises Ltd.
引用
收藏
页码:40 / 67
页数:27
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