Game equilibrium under the condition of heterogeneous information

被引:0
|
作者
Song, Yu-Tao [1 ]
Liu, Shan-Cun [1 ]
Hu, Hu [2 ]
机构
[1] School of Economics and Management, Beihang University, Beijing 100191, China
[2] School of Government, Peking University, Beijing 100871, China
来源
Beijing Gongye Daxue Xuebao / Journal of Beijing University of Technology | 2010年 / 36卷 / 02期
关键词
Commerce;
D O I
暂无
中图分类号
F [经济]; C [社会科学总论];
学科分类号
02 ; 03 ; 0303 ;
摘要
This paper establishes a two-period strategic game model with rational expectation tool to examine the trading behavior and the equilibrium pricing under the condition of heterogeneous private information. It proves that there exists a linear equilibrium when some special condition is satisfied and gives the analytical form of trading strategy and equilibrium price. Finally, it solves problem of the equilibrium numerically and indicates that the insider would exploit his private information gradually in order to obtain maximum profit.
引用
收藏
页码:284 / 288
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