Analysis on the efficient allocation of public assets and budget management based on evolutionary game theory

被引：0
|
作者：
Yan P. [1 ]
Wang X. [2 ,3 ]
Zhang Q. [4 ]
机构：
[1] School of Information Management and Statistics, Hubei University of Economics, Wuhan
[2] School of Economics and Management, Wuhan University, Wuhan
[3] Institute of Systems Engineering, Wuhan University, Wuhan
[4] School of Finance and Public Administration, Hubei University of Economics, Wuhan
来源：
| 1600年 / Systems Engineering Society of China卷 / 40期
基金：
中国国家自然科学基金;
关键词：
Department budget; Evolutionary game theory; Public assets;
D O I：
10.12011/1000-6788-2019-1822-13
中图分类号：
学科分类号：
摘要：
The asymmetry information between financial sector and budget units can easily lead to inefficient allocation and inefficient utility during the process of public asset allocation and budget managementWe analyze the evolution process of asset allocation and budget management and study the incentive effect of reputation and the constraint effect of supervision by using evolutionary game theory and methodWe analyze the interaction mechanism between the financial sectors' strategy and the budget units' strategy, and evolutionary equilibriums of financial sector and budget units are compared under static punishment mechanism and dynamic punishment mechanism. Our research finds that the incentive effects of reputation is effective for the high cost of budget unit, and the constraint effect of supervision is effective for low cost budget unit. Dynamic punishment mechanism is better than static punishment mechanism, and the more the amount of punishment, the greater the probability supervision, the better the supervision effect. © 2020, Editorial Board of Journal of Systems Engineering Society of China. All right reserved.
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页码：2872 / 2884
页数：12
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