Game theory-based analysis on utility of transportation management policy

被引：0
|
作者：
Yun M. [1 ]
Lao Y. [1 ]
Yang X. [1 ]
机构：
[1] College of Transportation Engineering, Tongji University
来源：
Tongji Daxue Xuebao/Journal of Tongji University | 2010年 / 38卷 / 04期
关键词：
Game model; Government-owned cars; Transportation management policy; Travel utility;
D O I：
10.3969/j.issn.0253-374x.2010.04.011
中图分类号：
学科分类号：
摘要：
This paper presents an investigation of the utility of transportation management policy by taking into consideration of the impact of blind zone, which is almost free from management measures. A case study was made of the travel by government-owned cars (GOC). The government's objective was formulated as maximum vitality of the urban center and mitigation of traffic congestion. Travelers' objective was to maximize their travel utility. Then Stackelberg game theory was adopted to describe the equilibrium between government and travelers. With assumption of travel utility function, the output of the game model was solved graphically by considering whether the urban center was developed or not. The results show that for a developed center the higher the proportion of travel by GOC is, the less effective the transportation management policy on reducing private car travel becomes and so does the whole transportation system.
引用
收藏
页码：527 / 532
页数：5
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