Robust analysis on agency problem under growth risk in equity financing

被引：0
|
作者：
Wang Y. [1 ]
Yu H. [2 ]
机构：
[1] School of Management, Chongqing University of Technology, Chongqing
[2] School of Economics and Business Administration, Chongqing University, Chongqing
来源：
Xitong Gongcheng Lilun yu Shijian/System Engineering Theory and Practice | 2019年 / 39卷 / 05期
基金：
中国国家自然科学基金;
关键词：
Agency problem; Equity financing; Growth risk; Robust decision;
D O I：
10.12011/1000-6788-2017-1635-14
中图分类号：
X9 [安全科学];
学科分类号：
0837 ;
摘要：
It is more difficult for the investor to monitor entrepreneur's moral hazard under growth risk due to the lack of information. To solve this problem, present study employed robust method to construct an equity financing model of cautiously optimistic entrepreneur facing growth risk, and to investigate the effect of agency problem on equity financing. Results indicate that the enterprise becomes more conservative under agency problem, which inhibits the equity financing and rapid development of the enterprise. Increasing the mean growth, reducing the wholesale price, or improving the enterprise valuation under the agency problem can improve the risk tolerance of the enterprise. In addition, handing over the management rights to the entrepreneur does harm to investor's benefit when investing the enterprise with high valuation, high growth mean or low growth risk. © 2019, Editorial Board of Journal of Systems Engineering Society of China. All right reserved.
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页码：1091 / 1104
页数：13
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