Decision analysis of product positioning of competing firms with consumer returns

被引：0
|
作者：
Chen J. [1 ,2 ]
Liang L. [2 ]
机构：
[1] School of Business, Nantong University, Nantong
[2] School of Management, University of Science and Technology of China, Hefei
来源：
| 1600年 / Systems Engineering Society of China卷 / 36期
基金：
国家教育部科学基金资助; 中国国家自然科学基金;
关键词：
Consumer return; Product positioning; Return policy; Subgame perfect Nash equilibrium;
D O I：
10.12011/1000-6788(2016)12-3123-10
中图分类号：
学科分类号：
摘要：
This paper addresses the problem of product positioning of competing firms with consumer returns. Considering two typical return policies: Full-refund and no-refund return policy, we establish four noncooperative models of price and product positioning under the framework of Hotelling methodology. The subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of each model is derived by the backward induction approach. Moreover, based on the comparative analysis of equilibrium profits in each scenario, we derive the Nash equilibrium strategies of the game of the selection of return policy and explicitly propose the conditions for guaranteeing these equilibria. We find that consumer returns plays an important role in firms' decisions of pricing and product positioning. However, the degree of product differentiation does not change because of consumer returns. Furthermore, we prove that the salvage value and the consumer return cost have direct impact on firms' choice of return policy. © 2016, Editorial Board of Journal of Systems Engineering Society of China. All right reserved.
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收藏
页码：3123 / 3132
页数：9
相关论文
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