Game analysis for PoS incentive consensus propagation in sharing economy blockchain network based on Nash negotiation

被引:0
|
作者
Tan C.-Q. [1 ]
Yang H.-J. [1 ]
Yi W.-T. [1 ]
机构
[1] School of Business, Central South University, Changsha
来源
Kongzhi yu Juece/Control and Decision | 2021年 / 37卷 / 01期
关键词
Blockchain; Mining pool; Nash negotiation; PoS consensus mechanism; Sharing economy; Transaction fee;
D O I
10.13195/j.kzyjc.2020.0445
中图分类号
学科分类号
摘要
Aiming at the trust problem in the sharing economy, the blockchain technology is used to build a shared economic blockchain network based on the proof-of-stake (PoS) consensus mechanism to achieve de-trust and decentralization. In PoS, the blockchain user provides transaction fees to encourage the mining pool to recruit verifiers for block propagation verification. Both the blockchain user and mining pool can benefit from more verifiers, but get the higher cost. This paper studies the conflict of interest between the blockchain user and mining pool in PoS of the sharing economic blockchain network from the perspective of Nash negotiation, and weighs the transaction fee and the number of verifiers to construct the Nash negotiation game model. Then, the existence and uniqueness of the Nash negotiation solution in the Nash negotiation game model is proved, and the optimal decision of the blockchain user and mining pool is obtained. Finally, numerical examples are used to analyze the impact of the communication cost and the number of verifiers on the optimal decision-making and utility of the blockchain user and mining pool. The research results show that both the blockchain user and mining pool can benefit from lower communication costs. And the Nash negotiation game model can effectively solve the conflict of interests between users and miners in the sharing economic blockchain network and improve network efficiency. © 2022, Editorial Office of Control and Decision. All right reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:219 / 229
页数:10
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