Exploring the impacts of initial permits allocation on the efficiency of intertemporal carbon market

被引：0
|
作者：
Zhu B. [1 ,2 ]
Jiang M. [2 ]
Yuan S. [1 ]
Xie R. [3 ]
机构：
[1] Business School, Guilin University of Electronic Technology, Guilin
[2] Jinan University, Guangzhou
[3] School of Economy and Trade, Hunan University, Changsha
来源：
| 1600年 / Systems Engineering Society of China卷 / 37期
基金：
中国国家自然科学基金;
关键词：
Banking; Borrowing; Carbon market efficiency; Intertemporal trading; Permits initial allocation;
D O I：
10.12011/1000-6788(2017)11-2802-10
中图分类号：
学科分类号：
摘要：
CO2 permits initial allocation is a key for the building and operation of carbon market. Exploring the impacts of initial permits allocation on the efficiency of intertemporal carbon market can achieve a deep insight on the interactions between initial allocation and banking and borrowing (BB) regime, which is conducive to improve the efficiency of intertemporal carbon market. By a two-period carbon market efficiency model involving permits initial allocation this study examines how permits allocation has impact on the efficiency of intertemporal carbon market without BB regime, with single banking regime and with BB regime, respectively. The efficiency without BB regime strictly depends on the initial allocation, and the market keeps inefficiency unless the efficient initial allocation for each period is obtained. If the total initial permits in the first period are sufficient in the market with single banking regime, the market will be efficient and equilibrium price will follow Hotelling rule. If the total initial permits in the first period are insufficient it will be inefficient and the discounted price in the second period is below the price in the first one. The efficiency with BB regime is independent on the initial allocation, and the market makes equilibrium price follow Hotelling rule so as to enable efficiency attainable. The feasibility of the model is validated by the numerical analysis. © 2017, Editorial Board of Journal of Systems Engineering Society of China. All right reserved.
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页码：2802 / 2811
页数：9
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