Probabilistic selling strategy study based on dynamic evolution game theory

被引:0
|
作者
Yang G. [1 ]
Liu X. [1 ]
Qin J. [2 ]
机构
[1] School of Management and Economics, Southeast University, Nanjing
[2] School of Management, Wuhan University of Technology, Wuhan
来源
Liu, Xinwang (xwliu@seu.edu.cn) | 1600年 / Systems Engineering Society of China卷 / 37期
基金
中国国家自然科学基金;
关键词
Differentiated-quality product; Duopoly sales; Dynamic; evolution game theory; Hotelling model; Probabilistic selling;
D O I
10.12011/1000-6788(2017)09-2231-13
中图分类号
学科分类号
摘要
Under duopoly retailers controlling products selling background in differentiated-quality product markets, we analyse the strategies of duopoly retailers with probabilistic selling (PS) or traditional selling (TS), by using Hotelling model and dynamic evolution game theory. The results show that duopoly retailers strategy choice are affected by the recognition level of consumers for probabilistic selling and the degree of difference between differentiated-quality products as well as considering other special type consumers' demands. That is if the recognition level of consumers for probabilistic products are big enough to make up for their the difference degree between the products, then consumers will choose probabilistic product; otherwise, the consumers will choose traditional products. The retailers should adopt to mixed strategies for the uncertain consumers, the consumers who don't consume probabilistic products completely and other special type consumers. These results have some guiding significance for PS practices. © 2017, Editorial Board of Journal of Systems Engineering Society of China. All right reserved.
引用
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页码:2231 / 2243
页数:12
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