Biform game for the cloud service supply chain with multi-person cooperation and technology innovation decision

被引：0
|
作者：
Nan J. [1 ]
Zhang L. [2 ]
Zhang M. [1 ]
Li D. [3 ]
机构：
[1] School of Business, Suzhou University of Science and Technology, Suzhou
[2] School of Mathematics and Computing Science, Guilin University of Electronic Technology, Guilin
[3] School of Management and Economics, University of Electronic Science and Technology of China, Chengdu
来源：
Li, Dengfeng (lidengfeng@uestc.edu.cn) | 1771年 / Systems Engineering Society of China卷 / 41期
基金：
中国国家自然科学基金;
关键词：
Biform game; Clique solution; Cloud service supply chain; Technology innovation;
D O I：
10.12011/SETP2020-0408
中图分类号：
学科分类号：
摘要：
In this paper, a biform game is used to study the cooperation and technological innovation of two-stage cloud service supply chain, which is composed of one cloud application developer and three cloud service operators. The strategy selection of supply chain members is analyzed according to non-cooperative game. The clique solution of cooperative game is used to distribute the profits of cooperative developers and operators. The results obtained in this paper show that, when not considering the technological innovation of the downstream operators, the upstream developers will choose the combination of stronger operators for cooperation, and only when the cost of labeling is low they will choose the branding strategy to increase the distribution revenue. When considering the technological innovation of the downstream operators, the poor downstream operators are only likely to cooperate with the developers if their innovation revenue is higher than that of the stronger operators, and only the operators cooperating with the developers will choose the technological innovation. The conclusion obtained in this paper will provide operational suggestions for the strategy choice and the distribution of benefits of the two-stage supply chain with multi-developers and multi-operators. © 2021, Editorial Board of Journal of Systems Engineering Society of China. All right reserved.
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页码：1771 / 1783
页数：12
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