Evolutionary dynamics of consumers' crowdfunding strategies based on replicator dynamics

Use large group repeated game-replicator dynamics research on consumer groups who are bounded rationality got through imitating and learning to update their strategies supporting or non-supporting crowdfunding under two scenarios fairness and altruism contribution rule. Established two people mult-strategy evolutionary game dynamic equations. Through analyzing the change of different parameters how to influence on the evolutionary stable equilibrium and the basin of attraction of the system, considering the failure of crowdfunding bringing regrets this paper researched the effects of crowdfunding success from different factors. The study find that under the fair contribution mechanism and without regard to regrets, supporting is the dominant strategy. Considering the failure of crowdfunding bringing regrets and generating negative benefit to consumer, when the target is smaller, the higher of the product quality level, the bigger of consumer's preferences and group benefits, the more beneficial to the crowdfunding evolutionary success. But the increasing of issued shares brings consumer's free-riding behavior, thus it restrains the success of crowdfunding. Under the altruism behavior, the bigger of consumer's preferences and group benefits, the higher of product quality level, the more beneficial to the crowdfunding evolutionary success. When financing target is fixed and the issued shares is increased, free-rider behavior don't increase, instead the success probability of crowdfunding be enhanced. © 2017, Editorial Board of Journal of Systems Engineering Society of China. All right reserved.