Stochastic evolutionary game model of international anti-terrorism alliance under uncertain environment

The counter-terrorism decision-making of the members of the international anti-terrorism coalition is faced with externally complicated random factors such as political competition, religious beliefs and national structure, which brings about high uncertainty for the international counter-terrorism situation. This paper constructs a stochastic evolution model based on the Moran process for the international anti-terrorism situation in a highly uncertain environment. Then, the equilibrium results of the counterterrorism strategies under different random disturbance intensities are calculated under the three scenarios of stochastic factor dominance, expected payoff dominance and super-expected payoff dominance. Studies have shown that the governments adopt "preemptive strike" or "passive response" strategy, which mainly depend on three factors: 1) Irrational external random factors; 2) The scale of the anti-terrorist coalition; 3) Cost-benefit of different counter-terrorism strategies. If the irrational random factors dominate the decision-making, the cost-benefit of the two strategies and the numbers determine the strategic choice of the member states. If the expected payoff dominates the decision-making, the "preemptive strike" strategy will become the general consensus of all member states only when the number of members of the anti-terrorist coalition is greater than a numerical value. Otherwise, the "passive response" anti-terrorist free-riding behavior will become stable strategy. © 2019, Editorial Board of Journal of Systems Engineering Society of China. All right reserved.