Optimization model of terror response facility location with hidden information

As terrorists have a strong preference in attacking civilians in densely populated areas, terrorist attacks can easily cause serious consequences. In order to improve the rescue efficiency and reduce the loss of attacks, the State can locate emergency facilities in the transportation network. Since the one with information advantage is usually dominant in the game, the State can also mislead terrorist's actions and improve her utility by hiding some location information. First, we describe the research problem and address it to a bi-level programming model in which terrorists' bounded rational behaviors are depicted according to the random selection theory. Second, both exact solution method and genetic algorithm are proposed, and they are applied in a real-world case study of Kashi area. The result shows that: when the State is able to calculate the rationality of terrorists, compared with disclosing all location information, hiding some information is more beneficial for reducing the expected loss, and the degree of information hiding is highly related to the rationality of terrorists. Conversely, when the State isn't able to calculate the rationality of terrorists, the information hiding strategy always plays a more effective role in the case that the terrorist's rationality is underestimated. © 2019, Editorial Board of Journal of Systems Engineering Society of China. All right reserved.