Non-cooperative game theory method for water resources utilization and pollution control

For ensuring water resources continuous utilization under the priority of water environmental protection, the objective conflicts between economic use of water resources and environmental protection are analyzed in this paper. The bargaining games model and leader-followers games model are established for water resource utilization and pollution control. This paper proposes the coordination method of mutual feedback decision, and analyses the relationship of Nash equilibrium solution and non-inferior solution. Taking Four-Inlet river net area of Dongting Lake as study area, the result shows that the equilibrium solutions of the bargaining games and the leader-followers games method are both at the frontier of the non-inferior solution of the multi-objective optimization method. The equilibrium solution range of the bargaining game is much smaller than non-inferior solution range. Moreover, the leader-followers games model obtains the only equilibrium solution, which can more effectively control total pollutant discharge. This research provides a new coordination method for conflict management between water resources utilization and environment protection. © 2022, China Water Power Press. All right reserved.