Defense method of smart grid GPS spoofing attack based on improved self-attention generative adversarial network

被引:0
|
作者
Li Y. [1 ]
Yang S. [1 ]
机构
[1] School of Control and Computer Engineering, North China Electric Power University, Beijing
基金
中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助;
关键词
Defense method; Generative adversarial network; Global positioning system; Phasor measurement unit; Smart grid; Spoofing attack;
D O I
10.16081/j.epae.202107014
中图分类号
学科分类号
摘要
In order to avoid the damage caused by GSA(Global positioning system Spoofing Attack) on PMU(Phasor Measurement Unit), a defense method of smart grid GSA based on improved SAGAN(Self-Attention Generative Adversarial Network) is proposed. Firstly, by introducing deep learning parameters, the improved cyber-physical model is built, and the measurement value at the current moment is calculated by using historical data. Then, a time attention module is incorporated into SAGAN's generator and discriminator respectively, and an improved SAGAN defense method is proposed to implement the cyber-physical model. By training the improved SAGAN, a pair of discriminator and generator is obtained. The discriminator is used to detect whether the collected measurement values are subject to GSA. When the attack is detected, the data generated by the generator is used to replace the spoofing data, so as to realize the active defense of smart grid GSA. Finally, simulation tests are carried out based on IEEE 14-bus system and IEEE 118-bus system, and the results verify the feasibility and effectiveness of the proposed method. © 2021, Electric Power Automation Equipment Press. All right reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:100 / 106
页数:6
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