Corporation social responsibility apportionment mechanism and pricing strategy for closed-loop supply chain under different power structures

被引：0
|
作者：
Liu S. [1 ]
Yao F.-M. [1 ]
Chen D.-Y. [1 ,2 ]
Teng C.-X. [1 ]
机构：
[1] School of Economics and Management, Harbin University of Science and Technology, Harbin
[2] College of Science, Harbin University of Science and Technology, Harbin
来源：
Kongzhi yu Juece/Control and Decision | 2020年 / 35卷 / 06期
关键词：
Apportionment mechanism; Closed-loop supply chain; Corporate social responsibility; Nash noncooperative game; Pricing strategy; Stackelberg game;
D O I：
10.13195/j.kzyjc.2018.1413
中图分类号：
学科分类号：
摘要：
The pricing decision problems for closed-loop supply chain with corporate social responsibility (CSR) under different power structures are studied. The optimal CSR apportionment mechanism and pricing strategy of member enterprises under Stackelberg game and Nash noncooperative game are discussed. The effect of member enterprises' CSR behavior to the pricing of new products and the recycling of waste products are analyzed. It shows that no matter under what power structures, the CSR behavior of member enterprise is conducive to expanding the market demand of new products and improving the return rate of waste products, and is also conducive to maximizing the social welfare of retailer, manufacturer and the whole closed-loop supply chain system. By comparing the optimal equilibrium results under the three power structures. the recycling effect of waste products is best under the dominant retailer power structure. And in the Nash noncooperative game, the new product has the lowest retail price and the highest market demand. Finally, the total benefits that the retailer and manufacturer obtain when pursuiting maximization of social welfare are the largest under their own dominant channel structure. © 2020, Editorial Office of Control and Decision. All right reserved.
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页码：1525 / 1536
页数：11
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