On healthcare coordination mechanism based on price-sensitive patients

被引：0
|
作者：
Huang S. [1 ]
Hu D. [1 ]
Chen W. [1 ]
机构：
[1] School of Business, Central South University, Changsha
来源：
Xitong Gongcheng Lilun yu Shijian/System Engineering Theory and Practice | 2020年 / 40卷 / 09期
基金：
中国国家自然科学基金;
关键词：
Equalization of medical services; Price sensitive heterogeneity; Pricing and subsidy; Stackelberg game;
D O I：
10.12011/1000-6788-2019-0461-15
中图分类号：
学科分类号：
摘要：
When the healthcare service market implements the medical cost sharing system, some patients may not go to the hospital because they are more sensitive to price due to differences in patients' income levels. One possible solution is to offer poor patients extra subsidies to get them to hospital. First, a Stackelberg game model is established for a healthcare system composed of government, healthcare provider and price-sensitive heterogeneous patient. Secondly, the equilibrium solution and its properties of the game are studied by backward induction. Finally, the equalization and non-equalization of medical services are compared. The results show that when market demand is low, the government should choose the free medical care system and choose medical cost sharing system otherwise. When patient's waiting sensitivity or the unit service cost is medium, both the patients' self-payment and the poor patients' additional subsidy are the largest. In addition, the equalization subsidy policy can not only reduce the self-payment of poor patients, but also reduce the self-payment of common patients. © 2020, Editorial Board of Journal of Systems Engineering Society of China. All right reserved.
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页码：2352 / 2366
页数：14
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