Third-party supervision strategy of water ecological PPP project based on evolutionary game theory

被引：0
|
作者：
Zhang Y. [1 ]
He N. [1 ]
Yang S. [1 ]
Wang L. [3 ]
Yuan S. [1 ]
机构：
[1] School of Management and Economics, North China University of Water Resources and Electric Power, Zhengzhou
[2] School of Public Administration, North China University of Water Resources and Hydropower, Zhengzhou
[3] AVIC Harbin Aircraft Industry Group Co., Ltd., Harbin
来源：
Water Resources Protection | 2021年 / 37卷 / 04期
关键词：
Evolutionary game theory; PPP project; Third-party supervision; Water ecology;
D O I：
10.3880/j.issn.1004-6933.2021.04.024
中图分类号：
学科分类号：
摘要：
Public private partnership(PPP)projects have a long operation period, which is prone to regulatory capture and weaken the regulatory function of the government. Based on the premise that the government is inferior, an independent third-party supervision agency is introduced to supervise the water ecological PPP project, and a game model is constructed to analyze the impact of the government's reward and punishment strategies on the behavior of the players from the perspective of evolutionary game. The simulation results show that the short-term negative impact of regulators on government punishment is very significant, but the long-term impact is small. At the same time, the simulation results find the scope of government rewards, and also find out the relationship between the cost of third-party regulators and their regulatory performance. © 2021, Editorial Board of Water Resources Protection. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码：166 / 172
页数：6
相关论文
共 14 条
  • [1] PENG Qinghui, ZENG Linghua, Chinese government investments in infrastructure boundary, Journal of Seeker, 11, pp. 71-72, (2009)
  • [2] HE Yihui, XIONG Huaping, Research on VFM qualitative evaluation method for urban water ecology PPP project, Yangtze River, 50, 6, pp. 161-165, (2019)
  • [3] GAO Ruolan, BAO Qin, Selection of government supervision mode during the operational period in PPP projects based on evolutionary game theory, Operations Research and Management Science, 28, 4, pp. 155-162, (2019)
  • [4] LU Xin, YIN Yilin, WANG Xiang, The third party supervision mechanism of PPP project, Value Engineering, 37, 23, pp. 65-68, (2018)
  • [5] WANG Shouqing, LIU Ting, PPP project supervision: Global wide experience and policy recommendations, Sub National Fiscal Research, 9, pp. 7-12, (2014)
  • [6] HU Yishi, SHENG Hetai, LIU Ting, Et al., Factors affecting capital structure of PPP projects, Journal of Engineering Management, 29, 1, pp. 102-106, (2015)
  • [7] YIN Yilin, YAN Ling, Research on the supervision and management mode of public project, China Soft Science, 12, pp. 16-21, (2003)
  • [8] YANG Binglin, A study on the theoretical paradigm and roadmap of enhancing China's regulatory governance system: Implications of responsive regulatory theory, Chinese Public Administration, 6, pp. 49-56, (2014)
  • [9] YE Xiaosheng, ZHANG Yongyan, LI Xiaopeng, China's PPP project government supervision mechanism design, Construction Economy, 4, pp. 93-96, (2010)
  • [10] LIU Zhao, ZHAO Zhihua, Can the third party supervision improve the efficiency of China environment regulation: Based on the perspective of collusion between government and enterprises, Business Management Journal, 7, pp. 34-44, (2017)
12