Optimal financing structure with moral hazard constraint: A review of dynamic financial contract

被引：0
|
作者：
Zheng J. [1 ]
Li Z. [2 ]
Ding J. [1 ]
机构：
[1] School of Finance, Guangdong University of Finance & Economics, Guangzhou
[2] School of Business, Sun Yat-sen University, Guangzhou
来源：
Li, Zhongfei (lnslzf@mail.sysu.edu.cn) | 1600年 / Systems Engineering Society of China卷 / 40期
基金：
中国国家自然科学基金;
关键词：
Assets pricing; Contract design; Dynamic moral hazard; Financing structure;
D O I：
10.12011/1000-6788-2019-2720-17
中图分类号：
学科分类号：
摘要：
Debt default, enterprise capital chain rupture and bankruptcy, as well as financial crisis have prompted economists to reflect on the efficiency and risk of financial contract. Taking the development of contract theory and technology as a logical clue, and the optimal contract design and optimization of financing structure in the asymmetric information finance environment as key research object, combining the inherent relationship between financing structure, asset pricing and moral risk, this paper makes a systematically review of the research methods and results of dynamic financial contract theory, and refines the ideas of constructing the unified theoretical system of research on corporate finance and asset pricing. Based on the theoretical development path, the paper discusses the future development direction of the dynamic financial contract theory, and gives the application prospect of the theory according to the characteristics of China's economic structure. © 2020, Editorial Board of Journal of Systems Engineering Society of China. All right reserved.
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页码：2159 / 2175
页数：16
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