Pricing model of ride-hailing platform considering rationally inattentive passengers

The ride-hailing services are booming in our daily lives, but it is unclear that how the platforms should set prices to maximize their profits when facing one kind of rationally inattentive passengers in a two-sided market. To fill this gap, we establish a profit maximization model for the ride-hailing platform based on queuing theory and rational inattention theory and analyze the properties of the model. Numerical examples are presented to demonstrate the impacts of perceived high and low service levels, information cost and prior belief on the optimal price and commission rate of the ride-hailing platform. The results show that (1) for different cities, there is always an optimal pricing strategy to maximize the profit of the platform. (2) To ensure maximum profit, the platform should disclose the service information of ride-hailing as much as possible, but also maintain the unknownness of ride-hailing services appropriately.