Incentivizing recycling in local governments: the moderating role of fiscal conditions in the adoption of Pay-As-You-Throw recycling programs

被引:1
|
作者
Peng, Jing [1 ]
Yi, Hongtao [1 ]
机构
[1] Florida State Univ, Askew Sch Publ Adm & Policy, 13 Collegiate Loop, Tallahassee, FL 32306 USA
来源
CHINESE PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REVIEW | 2024年 / 15卷 / 04期
关键词
Fiscal conditions; organizational attention; political market framework; recycling programs; WASTE MANAGEMENT; SOLID-WASTE; POLICY; US; INSTITUTIONS; INNOVATIONS; SYSTEM; CITIES;
D O I
10.1177/15396754241279412
中图分类号
C93 [管理学]; D035 [国家行政管理]; D523 [行政管理]; D63 [国家行政管理];
学科分类号
12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ; 1204 ; 120401 ;
摘要
This article aims to extend the political market framework by exploring whether policy demand or supply is the key consideration for local governments' policymaking and under what financial conditions local governments favor one over the other. We expect that local governments with good fiscal conditions are more likely to respond to public demand, but local governments with poor fiscal conditions pay more attention to supply influences. To test this idea, this study examines the moderating role of fiscal conditions within the political market framework regarding what factors account for adopting local governments' Pay-As-You-Throw (PAYT) recycling programs in solid waste management (SWM). The results of the fixed-effect logistic model support that fiscal conditions play a moderating role in shifting organizational attention on the supply side based on cross-section data covering 1,840 local governments in the United States.
引用
收藏
页码:241 / 252
页数:12
相关论文
共 2 条
  • [1] Which US municipalities adopt Pay-As-You-Throw and curbside recycling?
    Gradus, Raymond
    Homsy, George C.
    Liao, Lu
    Warner, Mildred E.
    RESOURCES CONSERVATION AND RECYCLING, 2019, 143 : 178 - 183
  • [2] Pay-as-you-throw versus recycling fund system in closed-loop supply chains with alliance recycling
    Ma, Zu-Jun
    Hu, Shu
    Dai, Ying
    Ye, Yu-Sen
    INTERNATIONAL TRANSACTIONS IN OPERATIONAL RESEARCH, 2018, 25 (06) : 1811 - 1829