The rules of multiplayer cooperation in networks of communities

Community organisation permeates both social and biological complex systems. To study its interplay with behaviour emergence, we model mobile structured populations with multiplayer interactions. We derive general analytical methods for evolutionary dynamics under high home fidelity when populations self-organise into networks of asymptotically isolated communities. In this limit, community organisation dominates over the network structure and emerging behaviour is independent of network topology. We obtain the rules of multiplayer cooperation in networks of communities for different types of social dilemmas. The success of cooperation is a result of the benefits shared among communal cooperators outperforming the benefits reaped by defectors in mixed communities. Under weak selection, cooperation can evolve and be stable for any size (Q) and number (M) of communities if the reward-to-cost ratio (V/K) of public goods is higher than a critical value. Community organisation is a solid mechanism for sustaining the evolution of cooperation under public goods dilemmas, particularly when populations are organised into a higher number of smaller communities. Contrary to public goods dilemmas relating to production, the multiplayer Hawk-Dove (HD) dilemma is a commons dilemma focusing on the fair consumption of preexisting resources. This game yields mixed results but tends to favour cooperation under larger communities, highlighting that the two types of social dilemmas might lead to solid differences in the behaviour adopted under community structure. Human and animal behaviour is strongly influenced by the structure of their social interactions. The interaction networks that characterise these social systems are diverse, but among them community structure can be often found. This work focuses on the impact of community organisation on the evolution of cooperative behaviour in the face of collective social dilemmas. The work shows that community organisation is a solid mechanism for sustaining the evolution of cooperation under public goods dilemmas, particularly when populations are organised into a larger number of smaller communities. However, cooperation can evolve for any size and number of communities under all public goods dilemmas considered. The success of cooperation is a result of the benefits shared among communal cooperators outperforming the benefits reaped by defectors in mixed communities. The size and number of communities is much more important in determining the evolution of cooperation than the way they are connected to other communities. These results have significant implications for the study of animal and human social behaviour, metapopulation dynamics, and general dynamics on social interaction networks.