How can stakeholders collaborate to promote the interconnection of charging infrastructure? A tripartite evolutionary game analysis

被引:2
|
作者
Yuan, Baiyun [1 ]
Zhu, Jiaming [1 ]
Chen, Zhuo [1 ]
Xu, Chunqiu [2 ]
机构
[1] Henan Polytech Univ, Ctr Energy Econ Study, Sch Business Adm, Jiaozuo 454000, Peoples R China
[2] Nankai Univ, Coll Tourism & Serv Management, Tianjin 300350, Peoples R China
关键词
Interconnection; Charging infrastructure operators; Regulatory service platform; Government subsidy policy; Evolutionary game;
D O I
10.1016/j.eswa.2024.124798
中图分类号
TP18 [人工智能理论];
学科分类号
081104 ; 0812 ; 0835 ; 1405 ;
摘要
It is important to promote the new energy vehicle development for the construction of charging infrastructure. Government guides charging facility operators to join a unified regulatory service platform in order to lower the barriers for automobile owners to use charging services in the context of interconnection. In this paper, we construct an evolutionary game model for three stakeholders, including charging facility operators, regulatory service platforms and governments, discussing how the strategy selection probability of each game party is affected by its own benefit-related parameters and other parties'. And we obtain the evolutionary stability strategy of long-term cooperation among the three game parties, analyzing the influence of government subsidy, revenue sharing ratio and cost sharing ratio on the evolution process of system evolution and stability strategy through numerical simulation. Results show that the strategy choice of the tripartite game is determined by its profit, and the probability of their strategy choice is determined by the probability of other players'. There are six stable equilibrium points in the game system, which each equilibrium point represents the equilibrium strategy that stakeholders may choose in the interconnection process of charging infrastructure, and the probability of choosing an equilibrium strategy is determined by the net return. The revenue sharing ratio of charging infrastructure operators, the cost-sharing ratio of regulatory service platforms, and the intensity of government subsidies are proportional to the evolution of the system to the ideal state, however the probability of charging infrastructure operators and regulatory service platforms choosing to join the platform and optimize the service strategies respectively shows a decreasing phenomenon when the above parameters reach to a certain level. The results provide theoretical guidance for strategy selection of charging facility operators, regulatory service platforms and governments.
引用
收藏
页数:18
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