Monetary policy opacity and disagreements in expectations about variables under central bank control

被引:0
|
作者
Montes, Gabriel C. [1 ]
Ferreira, Caio F. [1 ,2 ]
机构
[1] Univ Fed Fluminense, Dept Econ, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil
[2] CEMAFIN, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil
来源
ECONOMICS BULLETIN | 2022年 / 42卷 / 02期
关键词
INFLATION; TRANSPARENCY; CREDIBILITY; COMMUNICATION; UNCERTAINTY;
D O I
暂无
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
This paper presents empirical evidence of the effect of monetary policy opacity (lack of transparency) on macroeconomic variables' uncertainty (disagreement on inflation, interest rate, and exchange rate expectations). Once opacity in the conduct of monetary policy is related to information asymmetry problems between the monetary authority and the general public, and since opacity leads to uncertainties in the expectations formation process, this paper investigates the relationship between monetary policy opacity and disagreements in expectations about inflation, monetary policy interest rate and exchange rate. Hence, based on signal-to-noise ratios, we built a monetary policy opacity indicator using Brazilian monthly data from 2002 to 2020 that measures the level of mismatch between the agent's expectations regarding monetary policy authority interest rate and the actual value. According to evidence from several regression models, increasing monetary policy opacity increases uncertainty on interest rate expectations, on inflation expectations and exchange rate expectations.
引用
收藏
页数:20
相关论文
共 50 条
  • [1] Effects of the central bank communication on the expectations disagreements of the monetary policy rate: evidence for Colombia
    Zapata, Juan Camilo Anzoategui
    Ciro, Juan Camilo Galvis
    REVISTA FINANZAS Y POLITICA ECONOMICA, 2022, 14 (02): : 375 - 409
  • [2] ROBUST MONETARY POLICY UNDER UNCERTAINTY ABOUT CENTRAL BANK PREFERENCES
    Qin, Li
    Sidiropoulos, Moise
    Spyromitros, Eleftherios
    BULLETIN OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH, 2010, 62 (02) : 197 - 208
  • [3] Effects of transparency, monetary policy signalling and clarity of central bank communication on disagreement about inflation expectations
    Montes, G. C.
    Oliveira, L. V.
    Curi, A.
    Nicolay, R. T. F.
    APPLIED ECONOMICS, 2016, 48 (07) : 590 - 607
  • [4] The monetary policy of the European Central Bank
    Surico, Paolo
    SCANDINAVIAN JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 2007, 109 (01): : 115 - 135
  • [5] Accountability of the central bank for monetary policy
    Cecchetti, S
    CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN MONETARY AND FINANCIAL LAW, VOL 1, 1999, : 503 - 514
  • [6] Central Bank Credibility and Monetary Policy
    Park, Kwangyong
    INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF CENTRAL BANKING, 2023, 19 (02): : 145 - 197
  • [7] Rule-based monetary policy under central bank learning
    Aoki, Kosuke
    Nikolov, Kalin
    NBER INTERNATIONAL SEMINAR ON MACROECONOMICS 2004, 2006, : 145 - +
  • [8] Monetary policy under misspecified expectations
    Zhao, Mingjun
    JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC DYNAMICS & CONTROL, 2007, 31 (04): : 1278 - 1299
  • [9] Central Bank Credibility, Independence, and Monetary Policy
    Aguir, Abdelkader
    JOURNAL OF CENTRAL BANKING THEORY AND PRACTICE, 2018, 7 (03) : 91 - 110
  • [10] Central Bank Equity as an Instrument of Monetary Policy
    Mojmir Hampl
    Tomas Havranek
    Comparative Economic Studies, 2020, 62 : 49 - 68