EXPERIENCE AND CONTENT

被引:129
|
作者
Byrne, Alex [1 ]
机构
[1] MIT, Cambridge, MA 02139 USA
来源
PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY | 2009年 / 59卷 / 236期
关键词
PERCEPTION;
D O I
10.1111/j.1467-9213.2009.614.x
中图分类号
B [哲学、宗教];
学科分类号
01 ; 0101 ;
摘要
The 'content view', in slogan, form, is 'Perceptual experiences hate representational content'. I explain why, the content view should be reformulated to remote any reference, to 'experiences'. I then argue, against Bill Brewer, Charles Travis and others, that the content view is litre. One corollay of the discussion is that the content of perception is relatively thin (confined, in the visual case, to roughly the output of 'mid-level' vision). Finally, I argue (briefly) that the opponents of the coated view are partially vindicated because perceptual error is due to false belief.
引用
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页码:429 / 451
页数:23
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