A NOTE ON BARGAINING SETS IN ATOMLESS ECONOMIES

被引：0
|
作者：
Graziano, Maria gabriella [1 ,2 ]
Pesce, Marialaura [1 ,2 ]
Urbinati, Niccolo [1 ]
机构：
[1] Univ Naples Federico II, Dipartimento Sci Econom & Stat, Naples, Italy
[2] Ctr Studies Econ & Finance CSEF, Naples, Italy
来源：
JOURNAL OF DYNAMICS AND GAMES | 2024年
关键词：
Bargaining set; coalitions; veto mechanism; COMPETITIVE EQUILIBRIA; EQUIVALENCE THEOREM; CORE; INFORMATION; COALITIONS; CONTINUUM; MARKETS;
D O I：
10.3934/jdg.2024020
中图分类号：
O1 [数学];
学科分类号：
0701 ; 070101 ;
摘要：
. We consider an atomless exchange economy with a finite number of commodities. We introduce a new notion of bargaining set and show that it characterizes competitive allocations and, at the same time, it is robust to restrictions on the sizes of objecting and counterobjecting coalitions. Both results do not hold simultaneously for the bargaining sets defined by [18] and [23] for which we provide some new remarks.
引用
收藏
页数：16
相关论文
共 50 条
12345