Study on Resource Optimal Allocation of Internal Threat Nuclear Security Events Based on Stackelberg Game

Insider threats are a key issue in the physical protection of nuclear materials and facilities. In order to study the influence of insiders, the Stackelberg game is introduced into the internal threat nuclear security events, considering the defensive resource budget of physical protection system upgrade, and using mixed integer programming, the Stackelberg game scenario between external adversaries and defenders is mathemically described. Then, combined with the undetected probability, travel time and other main input parameters, the built-in accurate algorithm of CPLEX and YALMIP and MATLAB software is used to solve the model, and the interaction between the intention and strategy of the game participants is realized. The results show that compared with passive insiders, insiders with higher access rights and in the main path have a greater impact on game equilibrium. Finally, it provides some reasonable recommendations for optimizing the allocation of internal threat nuclear security event resources from the improvement strategy of physical protection system.