On stable assignments generated by choice functions of mixed type

被引:1
|
作者
Karzanov, Alexander V. [1 ]
机构
[1] RAS, Cent Inst Econ & Math, 47 Nakhimovskii Prospect, Moscow 117418, Russia
关键词
Stable marriage; Allocation; Diversification; Choice function; Rotation; EFFICIENT ALGORITHM; MATCHINGS; STABILITY;
D O I
10.1016/j.dam.2024.06.037
中图分类号
O29 [应用数学];
学科分类号
070104 ;
摘要
We consider one variant of stable assignment problems in a bipartite graph endowed with nonnegative capacities on the edges and quotas on the vertices. It can be viewed as a generalization of the stable allocation problem introduced by Ba & iuml;ou and Balinsky, which arises when strong linear orders of preferences on the vertices in the latter are replaced by weak ones. At the same time, our stability problem can be stated in the framework of a theory by Alkan and Gale on stable schedule matchings generated by choice functions of a wide scope. In our case, the choice functions are of a special, so-called mixed , type. The main content of this paper is devoted to a study of rotations in our mixed model, functions on the edges determining "elementary"transformations between close stable assignments. These look more sophisticated compared with rotations in the stable allocation problem (which are generated by simple cycles). We efficiently construct a poset of rotations and show that the stable assignments are in bijection with the socalled closed functions for this poset; this gives rise to a "compact"affine representation for the lattice of stable assignments and leads to an efficient method to find a stable assignment of minimum cost. (c) 2024 Elsevier B.V. All rights are reserved, including those for text and data mining, AI training, and similar technologies.
引用
收藏
页码:112 / 135
页数:24
相关论文
共 50 条
  • [1] The Stable Roommates Problem with Choice Functions
    Tamás Fleiner
    Algorithmica, 2010, 58 : 82 - 101
  • [2] The stable roommates problem with choice functions
    Fleiner, Tamas
    INTEGER PROGRAMMING AND COMBINATORIAL OPTIMIZATION, 2008, 5035 : 385 - 400
  • [3] The Stable Roommates Problem with Choice Functions
    Fleiner, Tamas
    ALGORITHMICA, 2010, 58 (01) : 82 - 101
  • [4] Equivalent choice functions and stable mechanisms
    Schlegel, Jan Christoph
    GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR, 2020, 123 : 41 - 53
  • [5] Stable Matchings, Choice Functions, and Linear Orders
    Karzanov, A. V.
    COMPUTATIONAL MATHEMATICS AND MATHEMATICAL PHYSICS, 2025, 65 (01) : 192 - 212
  • [6] EXISTENCE OF NONTRIVIAL STABLE SOCIAL CHOICE FUNCTIONS
    GOLBERG, AI
    GURVICH, VA
    MENSHIKOV, IS
    DOKLADY AKADEMII NAUK SSSR, 1986, 289 (04): : 788 - 792
  • [7] GENERAL INTERVAL CHOICE MECHANISMS AND THE FUNCTIONS GENERATED BY THEM
    AGAEV, RP
    ALESKEROV, FT
    AUTOMATION AND REMOTE CONTROL, 1993, 54 (04) : 662 - 671
  • [8] STABLE ASSIGNMENTS
    RABINOVITCH, I
    NOTICES OF THE AMERICAN MATHEMATICAL SOCIETY, 1975, 22 (01): : A253 - A253
  • [9] STABLE FUNCTIONS OF JANOWSKI TYPE
    Chandrasekran, Koneri
    Prabhakaran, Devasirvatham John
    Sangal, Priyanka
    JOURNAL OF MATHEMATICAL INEQUALITIES, 2021, 15 (03): : 969 - 979
  • [10] On uniform convergence for distribution functions generated by stable laws
    Arakelyan, A. H.
    ACTA ET COMMENTATIONES UNIVERSITATIS TARTUENSIS DE MATHEMATICA, 2016, 20 (01): : 3 - 14