Network slicing: Is it worth regulating in a network neutrality context?

Network slicing is a key component of 5G-and-beyond networks but induces many questions related to an associated business model and its need to be regulated due to its difficult coexistence with the network neutrality debate. We propose in this paper a slicing model in the case of heterogeneous users/applications where a service provider may purchase a slice in a wireless network and offer a "premium"service where the improved quality stems from higher prices leading to less demand and less congestion than the basic service offered by the network owner, a scheme known as Paris Metro Pricing. We obtain thanks to game theory the economically-optimal slice size and prices charged by all actors. We also compare with the case of a unique "pipe"(no premium service) corresponding to a fully-neutral scenario and with the case of vertical integration to evaluate the impact of slicing on all actors and identify the "best'' economic scenario and the eventual need for regulation.