Aristotle ' s Formal Identity of Intellect and Object: A Solution to the Problem of Modal Epistemology

被引:0
|
作者
Koons, Robert C. [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Texas Austin, Austin, TX 78712 USA
来源
ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY TODAY: DIALOGOI | 2019年 / 1卷 / 01期
关键词
modal epistemology; formal identity; essence; necessity; INTUITIONS; AQUINAS;
D O I
10.3366/anph.2019.0006
中图分类号
N09 [自然科学史]; B [哲学、宗教];
学科分类号
01 ; 0101 ; 010108 ; 060207 ; 060305 ; 0712 ;
摘要
In De Anima Book III, Aristotle subscribed to a theory of formal identity between the human mind and the extra -mental objects of our understanding. This has been one of the most controversial features of Aristotelian metaphysics of the mind. I offer here a defense of the Formal Identity Thesis, based on specifically epistemological arguments about our knowledge of necessary or essential truths.
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页码:84 / 107
页数:24
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