Why do banks require minimum balance to avoid a fee?
被引:0
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作者:
Shy, Oz
论文数: 0引用数: 0
h-index: 0
机构:
Fed Reserve Bank Atlanta, Res Dept, 1000 Peachtree St NE, Atlanta, GA 30309 USAFed Reserve Bank Atlanta, Res Dept, 1000 Peachtree St NE, Atlanta, GA 30309 USA
Shy, Oz
[1
]
机构:
[1] Fed Reserve Bank Atlanta, Res Dept, 1000 Peachtree St NE, Atlanta, GA 30309 USA
Checking account pricing strategy;
Minimum balance requirement;
Monthly account fee;
Common ownership;
Fee and interest rate competition;
D43;
G21;
L1;
D O I:
10.1007/s10436-024-00449-2
中图分类号:
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号:
0202 ;
摘要:
Large banks in the United States waive their monthly account fee if depositors maintain above a certain minimum balance in their account. This article analyzes the conditions under which banks benefit from applying this pricing strategy. I find that the minimum balance strategy is profitable when banks possess only moderate market power. In contrast, under strong market power, this strategy is less profitable than charging monthly fees to all depositors regardless of their deposit amount. Common ownership of banks reduces the gains from the minimum balance pricing strategy. Interest rate competition together with fee competition eliminate these gains.