Triple Eagle: Simple, Fast and Practical Budget-Feasible Mechanisms

We revisit the classical problem of designing Budget-Feasible Mechanisms (BFMs) for submodular valuation functions, which has been extensively studied since the seminal paper of Singer [FOCS'10] due to its wide applications in crowdsourcing and social marketing. We propose TripleEagle, a novel algorithmic framework for designing BFMs, based on which we present several simple yet effective BFMs that achieve better approximation ratios than the state-of-the-art work for both monotone and non-monotone submodular valuation functions. Moreover, our BFMs are the first in the literature to achieve linear complexities while ensuring obvious strategyproofness, making them more practical than the previous BFMs. We conduct extensive experiments to evaluate the empirical performance of our BFMs, and the experimental results strongly demonstrate the efficiency and effectiveness of our approach.