Bernard Williams' legitimate authority between universalism and relativism

This paper is divided into two main parts. In the first half, I identify a tension within Bernard Williams' political realist conception of political legitimacy. On the one hand, he was committed to a peculiar universalist criterion of political legitimacy - what is politically unacceptable is summed up in the old Catholic saying quod semper, quod ubique, quod ab omnibus creditum est. On the other, he supported the idea that what counts as political legitimacy depends on what we, in the here and now, deem to be politically legitimate - thus suggesting some kind of relativist criterion for political legitimacy. In order to eliminate this tension, I propose a two-step reconstruction of Williams' works on political philosophy. The second half of the article assesses three criticisms to Willliams' conception of political legitimacy levied by contemporary political realists. I use my two-step reconstruction of Williams to reject two of these three objections. In addressing the third, I sketch a reading of Williams' notion of political legitimacy in the context of his ethical project as a whole and, in so doing, overcome the difficulty.