The Impact of CEO Long-term Equity-based Compensation Incentives on Economic Growth in Collectivist versus Individualist Countries

被引:2
|
作者
Campbell, Cynthia J. [1 ]
Chang, Rosita P. [2 ]
DeJong, Jack C., Jr. [3 ]
Doktor, Robert [4 ]
Oxelheim, Lars [5 ,6 ,7 ]
Randoy, Trond [5 ]
机构
[1] Iowa State Univ, Gerdin Business Bldg 2167 Union Dr, Ames, IA 50011 USA
[2] Univ Hawaii Manoa, 2404 Maile Way, Honolulu, HI 96822 USA
[3] Nova SE Univ, 3301 Coll Ave, Ft Lauderdale, FL 33314 USA
[4] Univ Hawaii Manoa, 2500 Campus Rd, Honolulu, HI 96822 USA
[5] Univ Agder, Sch Business & Law, Servicebox 422, N-4604 Kristiansand, Norway
[6] Res Inst Ind Econ IFN, POB 55665, SE-10215 Stockholm, Sweden
[7] Lund Univ, Knut Wicksell Ctr Financial Studies, POB 7080, S-22007 Lund, Sweden
关键词
EXECUTIVE-COMPENSATION; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; PERFORMANCE; FIRM; HUBRIS; RISK; VIEW; PAY;
D O I
10.1162/ASEP_a_00432
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
This study examines the impact of the prevalence of long-term equity-based chief executive officer (CEO) compensation incentives on GDP growth, and we address the moderating role of individualist versus collectivist cultures on this relationship. We argue that long-term incentives given to CEOs in some firms may convey to other CEOs that they too may be able to receive such incentives and rewards if they emulate the incentivized and rewarded CEOs. In a longitudinal study across 22 nations over a 5-year period, we find that the higher proportion of CEOs in a country are awarded long-term equity-based incentive compensation, the greater future real GDP growth, particularly in collectivist countries.
引用
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页码:109 / 133
页数:25
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