A Comprehensive Protection Implementation of SM4 Algorithm Based on Threshold and Infection Technology

被引：0
|
作者：
Jiao Z.-P. [1 ,2 ]
Yao F. [1 ,2 ]
Chen H. [1 ,2 ]
Wang J. [1 ,2 ]
Kuang X.-Y. [3 ]
Huang K.-T. [3 ]
机构：
[1] Trusted Computing and Information Assurance Laboratory, Institute of Software, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing
[2] University of Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing
[3] Electric Power Research Institute, China Southern Power Grid, Guangdong, Guangzhou
来源：
Tien Tzu Hsueh Pao/Acta Electronica Sinica | 2022年 / 50卷 / 05期
关键词：
comprehensive protection; fault attack; infection; side channel attack; SM4; algorithm; threshold implementation;
D O I：
10.12263/DZXB.20210223
中图分类号：
学科分类号：
摘要：
Side channel attack and fault attack are great threats to the security of cryptography implementation. In view of this situation, this paper combines the threshold implementation(TI) and multiplicative infection protection idea to construct a comprehensive protection scheme with the ability to resist side channel attack and fault attack. Based on the idea of threshold implementation, the protection against side channel attack is realized. Based on the idea of multiplicative infection, the protection against fault attack is realized. The combination of the two theory makes the comprehensive protection scheme capable of resisting side channel attack and fault attack at the same time. In addition, threshold implementation improves the flaw of multiplicative infection when the random number is 0, and the ability of the protection scheme to resist fault attack is further improved by combining the idea of random permutation. Then, based on the above comprehensive protection theory, this paper constructs a comprehensive protection implementation scheme suitable for SM4 algorithm, and carries out a specific implementation on field programmable gate array(FPGA). Finally, the security of the comprehensive protection scheme is verified through theoretical analysis and security evaluation experiments. © 2022 Chinese Institute of Electronics. All rights reserved.
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页码：1066 / 1074
页数：8
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