Make or buy: Performance-vested equity incentives and firm innovation strategy

被引：0
|
作者：
Xie W. [1 ,2 ]
Zhang H. [1 ]
机构：
[1] School of Accounting, Dongbei University of Finance and Economics, Dalian
[2] China Internal Control Research Center, Dongbei University of Finance and Economics, Dalian
来源：
Xitong Gongcheng Lilun yu Shijian/System Engineering Theory and Practice | 2023年 / 43卷 / 01期
关键词：
independent innovation; optimal contract theory; performance-vested equity compensation; technology import;
D O I：
10.12011/SETP2022-0450
中图分类号：
TP3 [计算技术、计算机技术];
学科分类号：
0812 ;
摘要：
Based on the data of China’s high-tech firm from 2010 to 2019, we measure the innovation strategy implemented by firm according to the relative proportion between independent innovation and technology import, and empirically test the impact of performance-vested equity incentives on firm innovation strategy. The results show that the more stringent the performance-vesting conditions are, the more firm tend to choose the technology import strategy. The study on the interaction of contractual terms of equity incentives found that the greater the intensity of equity incentives, the shorter the exercise validity and the listed firm that grant restricted stock can play a better role in promoting the technology import strategy. Further research points out that the impact of performance-vested equity incentives on firm innovation strategy is stronger in firm with high level of information asymmetry, serious agency problem and high separation of two rights. This paper expands the optimal contract theory, analyzes the internal logic of senior management choosing different innovation strategies, enriches the relevant literature on the economic consequences of performance-vested equity incentives, and also provides policy suggestions and practical enlightenment for high-tech firm to optimize equity incentives and drive independent innovation. © 2023 Systems Engineering Society of China. All rights reserved.
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页码：36 / 57
页数：21
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