Cooperative evolution mechanism of unmanned cluster based on multi-player public goods evolutionary game

被引：0
|
作者：
Yu M. [1 ,2 ]
Zhang D. [1 ]
Kang K. [1 ]
Zhu W. [1 ]
机构：
[1] Institute of Command and Control Engineering, Army Engineering University, Nanjing
[2] Institute of Communication Engineering, Army Engineering University, Nanjing
来源：
Xi Tong Gong Cheng Yu Dian Zi Ji Shu/Systems Engineering and Electronics | 2020年 / 42卷 / 12期
关键词：
Aspiration driven; Cooperative evolution; Multi-player public goods evolutionary game; Unmanned cluster;
D O I：
10.3969/j.issn.1001-506X.2020.12.15
中图分类号：
学科分类号：
摘要：
To solve the problem of the autonomous collaboration of unmanned cluster under control rule failure, a cooperative evolution mechanism of unmanned cluster based on multi-player public goods evolutionary game is proposed. It starts with the requirement analysis of cooperative evolution in the unmanned cluster. And, the evolutionary game model of the multi-player public goods based on the aspiration driven rule is established. Then the average abundance function is constructed by theoretical derivation. Furthermore, the influence of cost, multiplication factor and aspiration level on the average abundance is simulated. Finally, the mechanism of the parameter change on the evolutionary cluster cooperation behavior is revealed via case study, and the rationalization proposals are suggested to provide a meaningful exploration for the transformation from theory to application. © 2020, Editorial Office of Systems Engineering and Electronics. All right reserved.
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页码：2787 / 2794
页数：7
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