Research on credit supervision mechanism of e-commerce platform based on evolutionary game

This paper analyzes the dynamic process of the "regulation dilemma" of e-commerce platform trading market by recent studies through simulation modeling. The game model includes the e-commerce platform, platform seller and government and analyzes the forming mechanism of the "regulation dilemma". The results show that the evolutionary trajectory of the e-commerce platform and platform seller presents a periodical fluctuation when the initial probability of the platform adopt self-discipline strategy is certain. Furthermore, the probability of the platform seller adopts the self-discipline strategy will increase when the e-commerce platform enhance the security deposit deduction ratio. The result also suggests that the reason for the "regulation dilemma" is that the accumulated deduction mechanism causes the loss of the platform seller to increase not only does it not contain the violations of the platform seller, but the probability of the platform seller adopting the self-discipline strategy is reduced. Therefore, introducing the government's external supervision for e-commerce platform, the evolutionary track of the e-commerce platform and the government through long-term repeated game presents stable equilibrium and spiral convergence. The key to cracking the "regulation dilemma" is that the government's strengthens supervision and regulatory incentives increased. The e-commerce platform will adopt active supervision. In the end, the results have some inspiration for the policies-making of government and the of credit supervision strategy of e-commerce platform. © 2020, Editorial Board of Journal of Systems Engineering Society of China. All right reserved.