Opening strategies for ride-hailing platforms in competitive market

被引：0
|
作者：
Wang J. [1 ]
Li Z. [2 ,3 ]
Dou R. [1 ]
Nan G. [4 ]
Li M. [1 ]
机构：
[1] College of Management and Economics, Tianjin University, Tianjin
[2] State Key Laboratory of Media Convergence and Communication, Beijing
[3] College of Management and Economics, Communication University of China, Beijing
[4] Management School, Hainan University, Haikou
来源：
Xitong Gongcheng Lilun yu Shijian/System Engineering Theory and Practice | 2022年 / 42卷 / 07期
基金：
中国国家自然科学基金; 中国博士后科学基金;
关键词：
competitive market; game theory; opening strategies; ride-hailing platforms; self-employed drivers;
D O I：
10.12011/SETP2021-1970
中图分类号：
学科分类号：
摘要：
Under the new trend of vehicle customization, some ride-hailing platforms (e.g., DiDi) have transformed from fully opening to partially opening. In the full opening strategy, the platform only recruits private car drivers, while in the partial opening strategy, the platform could also recruit self-employed drivers to provide services by using customized vehicles. Considering commission rate and vehicle cost, we use game theory to establish an economic model to study the optimal strategy combination. The results show that when the vehicles cost is too high (too low), the market equilibrium can be reached when both adopt the full opening strategies (partial opening strategies). When the vehicle cost is moderate, if the scale of self-employed drivers is large, adopting different strategies is optimal for the platforms; otherwise, adopting the same opening strategy will reach an equilibrium. In addition, when the vehicle cost is moderate and the size of self-employed drivers is small, a pareto improvement could be achieved if both platforms adopt the full opening strategies. Finally, the highest consumer surplus could be achieved if the platforms adopt the different opening strategies. © 2022 Systems Engineering Society of China. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码：1884 / 1899
页数：15
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