Private equity market structure based on Shapley value

被引：0
|
作者：
Ni X. [1 ]
Qiu Y. [1 ]
Zhao H. [2 ]
Sun H. [3 ]
机构：
[1] School of Software and Microelectronics, Peking University, Beijing
[2] School of Business, Sun Yat-sen University, Guangzhou
[3] School of Public Finance and Tax, Central University of Finance and Economics, Beijing
来源：
Xitong Gongcheng Lilun yu Shijian/System Engineering Theory and Practice | 2022年 / 42卷 / 04期
基金：
中国国家自然科学基金;
关键词：
Cooperative game; Income distribution; Market structure; Private equity; Shapley value;
D O I：
10.12011/SETP2021-2390
中图分类号：
学科分类号：
摘要：
At present, market participants in the private equity market are gradually differentiated, and the market structure has changed accordingly. From the perspective of cooperative game, this paper abstracts the private equity market as an alliance composed of fund managers and investors, and establishes a model to explore the impact of market structure on income distribution and human capital incentive based on Shapley value. We find that there are differences in the relative scarcity of human capital and monetary capital. Monetary capital occupies a dominant position in income distribution, while improving professional ability is the key to expand fund managers' income. The increase of monetary capital concentration can stimulate human capital investment, and the human capital incentive brought by monetary capital shows a marginal decreasing trend. The current work suggests that government should encourage and promote the synergy between market participants, which will create a win-win situation. Government-sponsored venture capital should focus on small and medium-sized private equity funds, so as to stimulate human capital incentive, to optimize the market structure and enhance the vitality of market participants. © 2022, Editorial Board of Journal of Systems Engineering Society of China. All right reserved.
引用
收藏
页码：923 / 936
页数：13
相关论文
共 31 条
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