人工道德主体:哲学假设与认识论挑战

被引:4
作者
苏令银
机构
[1] 上海师范大学马克思主义学院
关键词
人工智能; 划界问题; 机器伦理; 道德责任; 机器人;
D O I
暂无
中图分类号
B82-057 [道德与科学技术];
学科分类号
01 ; 0101 ;
摘要
机器伦理的兴起引发了人工道德主体的道德责任问题的争论。我们分析了争论的哲学假设,并认为这种哲学假设的特点导致了明显的概念和术语上的混淆。这种混淆与我们如何看待一些核心概念和术语之间的联系密切相关。反过来,这造成了一种缺乏基础的评估,这种评估在何种程度上提出,以及争论的立场是否兼容或者它们是否从根本上在解决相同的问题?这使得人工道德主体道德地位问题的争论受益于诸如概念、认知、实践,以及道德推理和道德立场等之间的关系上根本方法论的评估。因为这场争论在关于各种生命的道德地位方面具有相似之处,需要承认存在着涉及"什么是人工道德主体?""我们能够和应该赋予它们道德地位吗?"等问题的挑战。
引用
收藏
页码:62 / 68
页数:7
相关论文
共 20 条
[1]   Responsibility Practices and Unmanned Military Technologies [J].
Noorman, Merel .
SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING ETHICS, 2014, 20 (03) :809-826
[2]   On the Moral Agency of Computers [J].
Powers, Thomas M. .
TOPOI-AN INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF PHILOSOPHY, 2013, 32 (02) :227-236
[3]   On the moral responsibility of military robots [J].
Hellstrom, Thomas .
ETHICS AND INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY, 2013, 15 (02) :99-107
[4]   The Functional morality of Robots [J].
Johansson, Linda .
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF TECHNOETHICS, 2010, 1 (04) :65-73
[5]  
Moral appearances: emotions, robots, and human morality[J] . Mark Coeckelbergh.Ethics and Information Technology . 2010 (3)
[6]  
“Ain’t No One Here But Us Social Forces”: Constructing the Professional Responsibility of Engineers[J] . Michael Davis.Science and Engineering Ethics . 2012 (1)
[7]  
Virtual moral agency, virtual moral responsibility: on the moral significance of the appearance, perception, and performance of artificial agents[J] . Mark Coeckelbergh.AI & SOCIETY . 2009 (2)
[8]  
Un-making artificial moral agents[J] . Deborah G. Johnson,Keith W. Miller.Ethics and Information Technology . 2008 (2-3)
[9]  
Artificial agency, consciousness, and the criteria for moral agency: what properties must an artificial agent have to be a moral agent?[J] . Kenneth Einar Himma.Ethics and Information Technology . 2009 (1)
[10]  
Sharing Moral Responsibility with Robots: A Pragmatic Approach[J] . Anders Holst,Per Kreuger,Peter Funk,Gordana Dodig-Crnkovic,Daniel Persson.Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence and Applicat . 2008