THE CONDORCET JURY THEOREM, FREE SPEECH, AND CORRELATED VOTES

被引：241

作者：

LADHA, KK ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] WASHINGTON UNIV,CTR POLIT ECON,ST LOUIS,MO 63130

来源：

AMERICAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE | 1992年 / 36卷 / 03期

关键词：

D O I：

10.2307/2111584

中图分类号：

D0 [政治学、政治理论];

学科分类号：

0302 ; 030201 ;

摘要：

The Condorcet jury theorem provides a theoretical basis for democracy. Unfortunately, the theorem is known to hold only under the unrealistic assumption that votes are independent. This paper generalizes the theorem to correlated votes. The generalized theorem provides an analytical basis for free speech. Numerical examples seek to illustrate the main results.

引用

页码：617 / 634

页数：18

共 50 条

[1] Aggregation of correlated votes and Condorcet's Jury Theorem
Kaniovski, Serguei
THEORY AND DECISION, 2010, 69 (03) : 453 - 468
[2] Aggregation of correlated votes and Condorcet’s Jury Theorem
Serguei Kaniovski
Theory and Decision, 2010, 69 : 453 - 468
[3] A nonasymptotic Condorcet jury theorem
Ben-Yashar, R
Paroush, J
SOCIAL CHOICE AND WELFARE, 2000, 17 (02) : 189 - 199
[4] A resurrection of the Condorcet Jury Theorem
Koriyama, Yukio
Szentes, Balazs
THEORETICAL ECONOMICS, 2009, 4 (02) : 227 - 252
[5] A Condorcet jury theorem for couples
Ingo Althöfer
Raphael Thiele
Theory and Decision, 2016, 81 : 1 - 15
[6] A nonasymptotic Condorcet jury theorem
Ruth Ben-Yashar
Jacob Paroush
Social Choice and Welfare, 2000, 17 : 189 - 199
[7] Monotonicity in Condorcet Jury Theorem
Berend, D
Sapir, L
SOCIAL CHOICE AND WELFARE, 2005, 24 (01) : 83 - 92
[8] Monotonicity in Condorcet Jury Theorem
Daniel Berend
Luba Sapir
Social Choice and Welfare, 2005, 24 : 83 - 92
[9] A Condorcet jury theorem for couples
Althoefer, Ingo
Thiele, Raphael
THEORY AND DECISION, 2016, 81 (01) : 1 - 15
[10] PROVING A DISTRIBUTION-FREE GENERALIZATION OF THE CONDORCET JURY THEOREM
OWEN, G
GROFMAN, B
FELD, SL
MATHEMATICAL SOCIAL SCIENCES, 1989, 17 (01) : 1 - 16

← 1 2 3 4 5 →